

CUBA

Aftermath:

1) Shultz cut revealed to JCS on Nov 5;

revealed to NSA, State, WH, & height of crisis,

27 Oct (Saturday) (Estdowm writing memo for
President on Sat + Sunday). little traction.

Also, McN attitude in Nov: "SD talk can't"

Also, UK-US coordination with cooperation over India.

(Keyson away on India).

2) US affirmed ^{Engulf} Regime for Cuba seemed to come to
NSC on next following Cuban crisis.

Consider events leading up to Cuba as a failure of
"communication," listening, inference (SO misreading of
US response; US misreading of SU intention, estimates,
actions. Warning so successful, accurate, truly
inferred (+ prediction), and, failure of attempt to prevent.

(Does Gorbachev's comment on efficacy of comms
affirming lessons of failure to avert crisis or recognize it?)

revision of doctrine, ... over, area

Seventy - Day 22, '68

History

[How sure were they we would attack?]

What made them think?

How surprising was blockade? UFE speech?

The warning was it on 23 Oct? What
blockade were four months later?

[Off 81-2 shotdown of Cr 2 was unauthorized — but
and did it carry K? UKE?]

If U-2 overflight was unauthorized, does not did it
carry UFE? K?]

[Black-Box problem: Why did nations take the
obscurable actions they did? Under what circumstances
would they act the same — or different?]

Not enough data, requires
for input-output study —
besides, inner structure changes
by and look at the works?]
WHAT ARE SIGNIFICANT (surprising) OUTPUTS OF THE PROG?

[Did SW think that "the problem" was to get
some missiles on island — not, before
"detonation"? Explain difference in SW view
to Caba, we move to Derby; why didn't letter create
crisis? What response set right we do?]

Would SW think it justified to get postpone
detonation by a few days or weeks — even if they were
there? What if they had — as they on first
look showed ready missiles?]

Why would readiness have made us willing to attack?
How important in supporting our response was a US
feeling that Turkish missiles were rather intolerable
to us, insuperable?]

"Mosole reports in August: within listed to SEM: or
cruising, or down insects."

[Were there false alarms in Aug. left
from intell. analysts, as well as refugees?]

Suggestive reports often mid. Sept.:

- 1) Specific zone in Pima del Rio heavily guarded
by sons, Cuban desert
- 2) Oral comments by Castro side: we know RCH exists
now?
- 3) " " " " : Some stories report
of sight of tank convoy with what looked like M-37's.

Early Sept. activities on river, based on DCI instruction

that B-57s should be greatest possible photo obj.

Aug 31 - Sept. activities on and off of 29 Aug flight.

Early Oct. - Oct 11, activities on 31-29's

Oct 12: ²² special class system.

[Same: "create analysis" last part of the mid. 1st; 3. ft 13 spec'd.]

Dynamic pattern? Early stage of potential crisis

→ "tension; fear of incidents" that would heighten

→ tension + main part of crisis (not yet believed

to be high) → constraint on ② life-gathering

(U-2, noon, alignments) → delayed recognition of problem
increased import of "confidential"

and on ③ alert, readiness

[What if SAMs had been detected,

severe threat], prior to Oct 14!

consider options on Nov 10. I

flexibility

→ increased uncertainty

Bath increase chance of a fast scrappi

[Any reason to a fast scrappi con-
should we it these effects. Have they?]

[Yet, if incident does occur, consider effect of that

on ② noon, ③ readiness

sat 8th

U-2 over China; U-2 over Pakistan

24 Aug 30th

WHAT IF THESE HAPPENED PRIOR TO AUG 29?

(Would have seen U-2's on route; but flight time taken
agent reports more clearly a mission en route, so, 8th 20th)

[Note coverage of North flight being postponed
it was - not later or sooner?]

[What would have been different if our strategy consisted
in stand cover?]

Sept 10: Inc. North objective to Carter flight plan extension
missed + one flight. (cont + extend, cover) now 9/11
initial 9 flights, cover

Why no proposal to look again at weather?
Assumption on speed of installation? [SAMs?]

[Also mission on 10th cancelled? Why?][Where?]

over NE
Flight for 10th stayed the cancelled for weather. over Paris

17 Sept: unusable photos. 18-21: cancelled for weather.

Not flown when weather good. 4 days before takeoff

Between Sept 5 - Oct 14, 3 scheduled missions cancelled

by bad weather over target; re-attempt flown, but obscured

[Did Ops Committee foresee this problem?]

Mission deleted to over come from 22-26

Flight program completed Oct 7.

Single step; now fly SA-2 to final and if operational?

From N-1st — Oct 2, report expected results

any analysis of NRBBM west of Tucson

Cost (published?)

[Wg not checked at
initially?]

Flight planned on Oct 9 to cover both

Oct 4: MC argued for extensive overflights

[When did his auspicious start?] Special Group suggested

study (by NRC/Nyg, JCS, CNO) of alternative uses of aircraft

because of increased risk; meeting on Oct 9 to hear

report (see?); planned flight: bad weather on 10-13-87.

Why does SA plan route some of overflying international
waters, but S&C proposed mission does not?

Latter did weather on Oct 14-22 — 20 mission hours —

comparable to NRBB Oct 2-14?

Answered Oct. 15, 1963, P.D.A., P.S. Parker, Carroll; Taylor,
and; Dally, Johnson, Morton; Tolson, McC;
Carter; Gandy. [P.T.]

[Johnson? Johnson, soon?
Early? Johnson? Who else was actually told?
What did they do? Did others? First
responses? Did they know or expect JFK to be told?
Orlitz? Jim? why tell them but not JFK?
Our answer was this?

Jasper?
At first meeting, were Johnson, Orlitz, Tolson there?
What decisions, other than our own? Any? Responses?
[What can be inferred about responses if news had
been different?]

[If photos had revealed
oper. rounds & alert, with
warheads — immediate air attack night will have
been ordered? Johnson — would have been without doubt?
Early? How come?]

Wednesday night Atlantic City (and left in afternoon)

For off first suggestion (and?): that till Dec 2 in 1960

("should" more been treated) as "mistake" to be "removed"
"evidently"
by limited air strike

[could we have? How fast? How?]

[Did he feel that that suspicious states of weapons
would influence us so that
we were willing to act?]

Rhetorical (?) question (and?): why not just a first
strike? (NOTE: this would support our notion of
DOBBS in Sunday if we wanted that! by action?)

[Our position on Cuba a double basis of helping but
based on my prediction of this?]

[What access to Oral History interviews or tapes on Cuba -]

Any strike of strike (W400B?) : 50 sorties, 75

1 bombs for MB3A; another 100 sorties for warheads
100 for CAS. Invasion needed 2000 sorties, 4000 bombs.

morning
Thus Pres: 2 groups, "str." & "int." [WHO?]

[Also not formal ally of Pres; so blockade] [open? MB3A]
JFK decision: invasion could not be accepted

Thus after without Pres.

No air strike: danger to other countries; to Kinnear;
moral point of striking without warning, particularly as
it bore on the inevitable (?) Cuban civilian casualties

[Any thought to demonstration attack?] [Chair?]
[Yes offend this in 16 Oct.]

Blockade regarded as more realistic, provocative,
then limited air strike as it was done. (U-2 1961)

[How do they look now?] Johnson had called

U.S. took "act of war" on Oct. 6. But and?

attack based all "incident": [Presidently ignorant?]

"U.S. adaptations? Ready? J. P. Aguirre first asked
small "Reinhardt" anti-Soviet counter move." [! ?]

(Leader)

Ready? Hitler: now Hitler

First to blockade.

Monogram to S: "sinister type" of his country for

threat of German question; important no progress to

Berlin.

[No threat on Berlin — as reported?]

G instructed to make it clear and to also was only

for the purpose of contributing to the defense capability

of Cuba. [not, however purpose?]

JFK: no third of invasion. To Cuba; would have been

pled to give assurance to that effect if he had asked.

[So: guarantee was as new concession?]

G: Saw specialists in Cuba were giving training in handling

certain kinds of defensive arms. [They were operating

MOSCOW, SAMS.]

Question: Did G know we knew? Still Dobrynin did not
know. J

Friday night: Both his factors (blockade + long
strike), never joined by State + Defense. (How? Why?)

Stimson worked on paper for Pres.

W. Bundy paper was rejected

Final draft of speech written by Johnson. (See)

Saturday morning: Johnson receives answer (see)
(Johnson?)

Pres: 2:30. Everybody, with Stimson, Stuyvesant, Butler,
Christie: large; almost certainly must follow

with invasion (?); Cuban citizens cannot be
held responsible. Pres would not respond.
SEE

arbitrarily. JFK's plan as presented was "not surgical,"
was "apt to provoke" (why?) regime against committee

Committee was "only course of action compatible with
our principles. Only a small risk the world will fall the
longer."

|| Evening: JFK talked to Done later, to Macmillan
(New York; just then)

To beginning war, unless we of freedom

If contention continued, might be necessary to strike

other, minor basis; unlikely it would continue, esp.

since SAC alert

then

If serious moves were made against US, it might
be necessary to strike, but not to use force against Abc;
however, it might be necessary to make a compromising
threat w. SU.

[Any planning? Analyze.]

Sunday morning:

Till 10, when final appeal to Hm, possibility
we would open with strike.

2:30 NSC, incl. Anderson

(after dinner!)

[How come, no "scenario" approach? Did

R. Johnson invent this?]

Monday

Evening

McNamara & Palo - message to fighters.

5: final copy of NSC (MacDonald)

Established criterion - visual appearance of destroy,

sizing or range

objection of not saying state or invasion had been
considered (or registered):

Why no quantitative criteria? lack of "hard" evidence
to convince this; + opinion of experts that SC
missiles were unlikely.

Note: Congress reaction - via sticks, invasion

(Mrs. Taylor, McN. first view??)

Macmillan reply to Bruce Briley, 6 Monday - its not just
not so much on precedent as on unprecedent condition of
the modern world in a nuclear age.

Must be ready for vital action against Berlin, and

as person or weaker parts of the Free World defense system.

Monday night:

[First at Rest-Delay talk, 22 Oct.]
- thought,

10:40-11:35 Hall and Anderson.

and briefing on nuclear weapon. (?)

Tuesday morning:

Paul to Bill: We've won a considerable victory;
you and I are still here." [Did not believe this?]

[Reinhardt: Big + JFC bid not; issue was
not immediate concern, but slippery road.]

[Why did SO persist in buying power of nuclear?] [
What did this "convey" to us?]

Exam: 10: 3 subcommittees. Berlin, advance planning,
comm.

Ridge. comm. for inter-allied relations
click with him

"Advantages of not letting others play would not be
able to tell our hand, & would be free to dispose

Wardens

in Nitro's name

Fear that Mac would force JFE to agree
against some course of action

(Over?)

Tuesday: Memo for JFE (via Post): Tyden, Talbot & Poston
arrange without for MRCM to Ensign; privately
urge JFE to phone at first sign so soon as MLE ---
available? preferable? Agreed by that. Answer to
desire from bypassing MRCM to Combs or ME (but, MLE?)

SEE

7 pm Party of 6 interested

Span NCV said 25 war ships enroute to Cuban
this course unchanged [TRUE?] in past 24 hrs.

Friday morning: 10. Picard

(M. Stevenson) (Action?)

Want an answer concerning [Plot] [Plot fewer days]

of law crime]. An [This is illegal].

Does still [plotting]

disk of Forman & Scali; directly under UN supervision.

pledge by Carter not to resort offensive weapon (?)

in Cuba; pledge by US not to invade.

Scali, Wilson, Bush (that. Bonnfield?)

Scali - Form 7:45: not possible, two shots,

Also, feels at UN and by Sov. Ambassador to [shameless]

[why?]

K letter begins going at 6; had been translated

by US amb in Moscow. [so, not influenced by Scali]

letter: if comments by Paris, and if flat, needed, the world
simply change anything more than this, the question of the
distrust, not as of the answer to which you call offensive.

With all other amounts as well [I] would
not differ.

If amounts were given by the Pres and the gov.
of the US that the USA itself would not participate
in or attack on Cuba, and would restrain others from
actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet,
the world immediately change everything. I am not speaking
for Fidel Castro, but if that that he and the gov. of
Cuba, evidently, would declare, despatched and would
appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor.
Then, too, the question of arms would disappear, since, if
there is no threat, the arms is as a burden for every
people. Then, too, the question of destruction, not only of
the amounts which you call offensive, but of all the
amounts as well, would not differ.

It is therefore always statesmanlike wisdom. I propose
we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for

Cuba, will not carry any kind of armament. You must declare that the US will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support the any sort of force which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuban naval shipyards.

Session recessed at 10 pm to dinner.

Agree to treat as non-final file offer. Drafting an affidavit State and W.H. (Reaction of Brits, in Italy, though, no explicit offer to remove; suggested Castro's comment needed; asked guarantee of Cuban security — difficult domestically for US)

(Did Nitze, Boston, know?)

as FOI blockade, notifying US as nearest allies (?) or a possible amicable

Sat morning:

Exxon at 10. Discuss draft aff [clerk]
Meanwhile, Radio Moscow letter: you to remove;
July, inspection.

Mon 21 (start time): U-2 shot down.

U-2 supflying. Our fighters scrambled. Within time,
fire on plane. Castro would to shoot down plane.

[SAC system] [Indy?]

Types standard.

[Indy]: JFK streets on ridge, Cindy?

Decision by Pres: pick out of each letter been for
solution agreement.

Exxon at 4: consider personal replies.

2 planes fired on Pres. aff and two messages to a
letter sent at 8:05 pm.

See that night, message to Faletter: all NAC.

Exxon at 9: discussion of additional steps regarding such
as PRC blockade, notifying US newest sites. (?) a possible air strike.

UNC

AM 10-3-57 (10 Dec 57)

Probable Intel. Warning of War Threat in the US

Alternatives think so: warning
conditional induction of one's own action
statement evidence of conditional decision

(Would threatener make a threat
but, give odds that he would
carry it out? Does he
expect to?)

Way to get others to do A, which others don't want to do:
get them to agree to threaten to do A if third party S
does & doesn't do Y; gets them to commit US first, etc.

Then for (A) \equiv for (S will fail to do Y, etc.) — what may be
high. "If you don't come up to 90 days supply,
we'll come down."

Others reflect the fact that doing A not only hits US
but also hurts S, whom we wish to influence.]

UNC

The danger of effusion in crisis confrontations rests partly on values, emotional reactions to events as they occur, but partly partly on theory is to the "inversible" course of events or the nature of the opponent or the "feasible" alternatives.

(cf: "dangerous theory")

(any use of one nuclear must lead to all-out war between)

(explosive theories). [Mobilization → War?]

[ability to tell apart from total mob] [which did you "decide on 1/3?"]

Possibility of warning: What hypotheses is to possible enemy plans, courses of action, goals, values, will evidence be related to? stat.

(also problem of observational/reporting uncertainty:
given instruments, what is probability that X has occurred,
given a report, our claims, that X has been observed
by means A ? Then, what is $p(H_0|X)$?

UNC

To interpret SU moves (preposition, etc., threats, imminent decision to attack — "How likely do they think it is that they will attack?

Or, what war will occur?

At identified long-range beta — they say would probably if prob of war or attack were high; then try to observe three: a) with high prob b) with high confidence in observation; c) early.

[This "unambiguous" indication can be vulnerable without (a), given (b) + (c).]

To interpret, must have some good info on US-Allied moves that may have triggered (French planes in corridor) SU "response." To identify possible "signals" in advance, so as to monitor or suppress, know

1) Our operations, emanations; 2) SU collection sources

3) SU model of our behavior; hypothesis they are testing, and

likelihood functions. [This likelihood function, interpretation of

weighting of evidence, might depend on "level of tension."

5. What had K failed to withdraw IL-28's?

What if quarantine had been lifted earlier?

3C Note effect of K failure to consult Castro before 28 Oct
on SU-Cuban relations; + SU later difficulty in
extricating IL-28's.

DD/I Research Staff: Low Number Cam Vents in Cuba

ORR Cuba 1962: K's miscalculated risk 13 Feb 64

CRISES

1. Interpretation of motive from choices must take account of all factors in decision theory analysis (at least): utils, prob., (crit. risk).

e.g. SW knew US would see in Cuba; but how much risk of US military action could they accept?

f.e.g. When did K concern writer? (late '61? or early '62?)

2. How did Sino-Soviet attitude change during study?

What types were rejected? Why? What info was not available earlier? What conclusions were likely then?

3. When did Congress/newspaper reports of missile start (before mid July?) / early Sept? How synchronized with actual events?

McCone

1. Also they may: SA-2's to prevent overflight, protect missile.

No, except perhaps for 2 SA-2 sites (, East

5. Has SW ever protested against V-2 crews? How much can be inferred from lack of effort? Failure to proceed with SA-2's is more significant. :)

6. Photos as confirming, establishing validity of, info from other sources. [Analyze role of photos as evidence for hypotheses suggested/generated by other means.]

7. As info: note distinction between comm and electronic emanations. (latter, too, can be 'comm' — as well as "information.")

8. Background context: SU and to others: nature + scale.
Brooklyn, Aug., Egypt

9. Collateral reports of construction, etc. in first half of '62 not supported by photos. What conclusions?

3) Reports could not be "basis for assuming"...

4) But were they without basis? (Probably not; perhaps based on known of personnel, not detected by photos)

5) Did availability of photos, then, "reduce info available to gov"?
(compared to info available to those without clearances?)

10. Why were missiles transported clandestinely : but not
constructed openly?

11. CHART various time-tables.

12. Correlate: US public statement }
Congress/news assertions } RAND?
Int. guesses, estimates
actual
various kind of evidence

13. Compare McN. intell briefing to Congress.

14. Why switch to physical means of on 5 Sept? How did
^(all 14 now)

Cuban/Sovs probably interpret this? (They were aware).

What was attitude/intention of this by US military? Still?

Why reversal on 14 Oct?

Have they ever been activated - minimal? Pretext
dog, etc.

" SA-2's could have been activated before 14 Oct; could
have been activated by mid-light in west: to screen from
recon.

16. Did 5 SA-2 missions cover later sites west of Havana?
17. Implications of extreme mobility / flexibility of SA-2 (MRCM)
systems for US planning, influence.
18. How did SC deployment practice in Cuba with SA-2's
MRCMs compare to practice in SC + elsewhere? How does
this affect inferences made from SC data?
(Concremey; lack of reuniting; field operation...)
(variation in reuniting; > 1/2 never reuniting).

19. Analogy: dependence of an SA-2 site on acquisition by other sites + EW, to raise it from stand-by condition so it can react fast enough (can't stay in firing condition more than 20-25 minutes); this limits capability for independent action.

(But U-2 is slow enough so individual missile can react; also, does height ~~too~~ increase radius of SA-2 coverage?)

20. Implications as evidence of lack of photo confirmation (e.g. of SA-2 missiles on launcher) when there was no photo coverage.

21. Aug. 5 showed activity at 2 sites but negative on many others (central on those not covered); on Aug 27 (?) many seen already in place. Most of these had had gaps in coverage of 23-61 days. Why?

22. In studying linkage of crises, for some the Bay of Pigs must have been a key element in forming attitudes. What?

23. See Horowitz's graph on morg. of plots soon after Cuba.

To what does longer attributable delay in maturing the J-3, JCS operations — cost the final improvement?

24. Comparison analysis of SA-2 deployment (revealed values) to Neumann study of 1954. What is explanation?

(Question not equivalent to "What was 'their' goal?" Analyze difference.) Note redeployment on 'reflection' — after crisis [IS THIS WHY/WHEN 'REFLECTION' OCCURS?]

25. SAMs in west replaced by first work in Sept.

26. KEY'S 'EVIDENCE':

- Ability to ^{deploy or} operate SAMs earlier, and failure to do so.
(^{then MRBM's})
e.g. (by delaying IASIM site construction + MRBM deployment by months; instead of starting 14 months before US system activated on 27 Oct).

Ability to conceal deployment in Cuba (for longer) & failure to try.
e.g. by delaying introduction of unique equipment: missiles, fuel + oxygen tanks.

Failure of SC to ^{operational} prepare even capability to use SA-2s to prevent recon. or to defend MRBMs.
Activation of SAM radars + C+C nets on 26-27 Oct: not sooner, and then apparently sooner than planned; Moscow hits on 23-24 Oct.
ignoring of Cuban military communications system.
IRBMs revealed image of SC threat to US.

27. Note dramatic emergence of SAM radars on 26 Oct +

AO C+C on 27 Oct. (known to whom, in gov? public?)

How interpreted at the time, in US? How long to analyse? How related ~~to~~ Pace, others to shooting of U-2 on 27 Oct? How was latter interpreted by various people at time?

WY

28. What evidence is there that SO considered constraint from
U-2 flights (as distinct from preventing U-2's, or refusing
deployment) possible? (ICBM sites potentially hard to cover;
then why not delay starting them?)

29. Lack of countervails as indicating low prob of US
response, in SO mind.

(Were they indifferent to nature or timing of US
non-military response?)

30. SO also ignored Pres warnings on 4 Sept
(NOTE: overflights stopped on 5 Sept, after threat
of "grave issues" if offensive missiles found).

13 Sept: during interview.

[What were WH-Pres expectations during this
period? Staff background of these statements?]

31. Lack of identifiable missile activity at time of 4 + 13 Sept
statements: so SO could not (did not?) interpret Pres
statements as based on knowledge + industry acceptance.

(13 Sept: first silent of MRBMs apparently above, below detectability)

32. Ambiguity of failure to alert:

a) Hostilities not faced

b) Situation very delicate, fear of effect of alert-as-info (bad message), assuming it would be seen.

(Failure to carry out actions SC would be sure would not be observed, less ambiguous).

c) People in charge of alerting not in on problem.

33. SC protection against ground observation: vs. US, Cuban, world public (Cuba outside known off-limits to reporters 25 Sept.)

34. SC origin of plan probably not till late '61; final commitment to start (?) probably not till April-May '62 (evidence?). Spots left beginning of July: decision could have been as late as May.

Pubs long preparation in Feb.-Mar., perhaps on contingency (or exploratory) basis.

35. Report in for '62 that K intended to complete
production of missiles this year — to resolve Berlin.

36. Analyze how missile move would have
"strengthened K's bargaining position" over Germany.

37. Relation to SC decision to build up in Indonesia
(Feb-April '62 decision): possible commitment of
Sov forces against NATO member (Holland) if conflict
in West New Guinea. Study?

38. Castro assertion of authority over "old Coms" in
Marl-Aril '62: assumed stable political climate (?)

39. 3018

Compare to US.

39. SC leaders ready to reduce Strategic nuclear (?) imbalance against SU drastically & rapidly. with 41 ICBM sites, US would have been more than 50% immune over and - 62 cephs.

40. How much — and why — would SC now have discredited US resolutions, will to resist? (lowered US bargaining power). Role of US public statements. What could have affected this?

Also: 1) substantiate
(in various cases) } of SU military power.
image: to... }

- 2) demand to US } in SU eyes
attack on Cuba } in Cuban eye
- 3) demonstrate support to ally
- 4) demand Cuban withdrawal
- 5) if time of retreat, leverage (focus of attention) for removal of US missiles bases.

// (e.g. role of K's statement in Madrid on Cuban missile bases)
in creating a problem for him, given our advocacy. So K's commitment failed to deliver; USK's

50. SU knew high rate of US ICBM/Polaris activation
to start in '63, swamp effect of Cuba.
So, temporary gain.

51. Note K statement on 12 Dec 62: 20% of all aircraft
of SAC on air alert.

20 Nov - amount of withdrawal of IL-28.
52. SU option from 22-28 Oct: insure crisis did not escalate
test US reaction
if US firm, salvage

53. In response to L-JFK letters: same, 26 Oct letter
as interpreted in JFK public reply. Did study have access?

54. 31 Oct: SU agrees to permit UN inspection of sites.

Laos

Neustadt [hidden episodes — by of Pige,
Turky — can lead to important — but erratic,
unrelated, & unknown to others — 'learning' by
some participants; and to "increase ration" by
them that are concealed from Pres.]

[How much to allow know of Turky? CINCO:]

Questioning

Crisis is an acute, urgent, search process:

(search for cause, understanding, recognition,

attribution); high level search for a solution,
or low - relevance
in programs; insight inadequacy of current &
currently proposed actions. (The "cognition" is ^{expanding by} ~~expansion~~)

a) Was situation - challenge + inadequacy -
foreseeable? Was there a failure of anticipation?

b) Was a more adequate response attainable
earlier, so that acute, urgent search process
would not have been necessary?

(Contrast with situation when "We saw the coming, and we
know what to do (but still looks best is good enough")

Note two different operational dips of "crisis" due
to same situation; dimensions are highly correlated.

Why?

[Whistfulness] can affect my client or decision
frameworks & helps consider all, actions planned,
consequences likelihoods

3) Alerting process in different agencies; plans,
 ^{tentatively} actual, use, actual execution

4) Termination Phase; the payoff

10) Survey Postcrisis problems

a) effects of leaving left agencies, public
 and private allies in dark

b) effects of ad hoc org, bypassing

c) neglect of other problems (Siegwart)

d) role of time effect in setting up a new
 crisis, dynamic linkage

e) demobilization; budgets

f) political impact: effect on issues

 image
 votes

g) new personal relationships with

 ally, enemies, staffs

(dr. left out of Lebanon, staying,

Mac in Cuba, K in Cuba, etc.)

Tasks (e.g. Bawingta):

- 1) Tabulate intrating linkages: instances, and classes, + sequences of couplings between agencies in a crisis: initiatives, requests for info, approval, action, naming, statements, comments

Survey: By passing, step-down reporting,
ad hoc orgs; use of "non-professionals"
WHY? EFFECTS? FUTURE?

2) Alhans linkages

3) Event linkages.

- (4.3) Search for "should-have-been" crises: "missed" crises; Hungary, Chile Wall; Taiwan of Prague, 1939.
- 4) Search for "might-have-been crises" - e.g. "incidents" - residents. How/why were they prevented? Are all "real" crises failures? Were they preventable?

5) Tabulate surprises: finds impacts, reasons.

- 6) Tabulate uncertainties, doubts: effects (final resolutions).

- 7) Survey planning within gov; use of checklists, SOP's. OVER

or those little-known crises, or related crises,

that my study? (Also we are crises that
failed to be mentioned; like, literature of surprise,
^{surprise}
independence.)

Questions:

1) Do you feel that crisis studies you have
seen have systematically left out important factors—
distortion, left jobs etc?

2) What are factors likely to seem important to
top people and be unknown to lower? Intra-political
e.g. domestic political; channels;

3) How my goals sought by leaders differ from those
one would infer from the inputs — life, cables,
int. etc., — and from what outsiders & outsiders can
see?

4) How has your own experience in crisis changed your
views from earlier ones? (as to the nature of crisis
makers).

5) Your experience in crisis much influenced your view of meth?

Marshall:

Did SAMs back to plan of "incident"? Was that a
form of the US public reaction, being ~~conscious~~
knowing about its action it felt unnecessary +
unwarrantable.

Like the unwillingness to release ~~Gatlin Report~~

What would have been the reaction to a shootdown
(expulsion, say, by a public pro-democracy of
flight, reaction for Cuban sovereignty) - wouldn't this
have been in rules of the game?

Black Box

Fox: All eyes but top level see all wires going in (some of them) and wires going out.
cables still go to
only see it's own in the wires, so then
it's right - the actions, directions...

What really goes on inside the Box? What
really worries the President or the Top Staff? What
do they feel uncertain about, & can about? (And in
retrospect, were they right to focus on those?)

Why is it important to see within the Black Box

General problem was how to keep Indians & Egyptians from
fighting.

Cyrus how to keep Turks & Turks from fighting.

["No one was worried about Jews coming in."]

Colonel: "No one - nobody ever - believed that
Sav would do such a thing. There were reasons for calling
off recon - weather - but none of them would have
been enough if anyone had thought there was a real chance of
flying missiles." EAS AT SPACE HARBOUR OVER

Turkist nukes: PK first proposed to get them out
not earlier than 1st Jul. ^{over} RK ~~handed~~ ^{handed} out
TII Polaris had — bang — arrived on scene.
So it was a "small but victory" — Jan (?)

"But — how does PKs get the system
moving? How does he show he really wants something?

He wrote the strongest cable I've ever seen, in 1984:

"I want the ROC Army reduced by 6 divs — not 3
or 4 or 5 — and I want it in 6 months."

Years later, ROC Army reduced by 60,000 men.

"How much of our reaction to Iraq was caused by
monumental failure at our allies for having the gall to
carry out that operation without consulting us, country,
attempting to conceal & deceiving us?"

26 March

Nev: JFK's greatest confidante, unless RFK, was Rose; friend since 1938; Doris sister was Kathleen's best friend (she killed in plane crash); Kathleen married Doris' adoptive cousin. Rose wants to write memoirs, for fear of reprimand: What would they tell each other to a criticizer.

Sitragency Post-Mortem Study *

ACDA - Larry Holmes *

Invision of Sandland - McG, RFK

Obs just wouldn't eat anything but pictures.

RFK reaction on seeing pics on 15 Oct:

"I know what these are. Oh, shit!"

McN informed only by "label" it: photos, SI,

"Agent reports 'aren't evidence.' ("just
opinions, guesses...").

[On camouflage: were nts, i.e. just for protection against
attack, not photos? i.e. did SC assume that
infrared would be used in photo recon?]

[But then they were wrong. Cuba 1962 "study apparently
aimed to refute it. Has not adjusted
his assumptions?]

Increasing frustration of intell. analysts, last week
in Sept; agents' reports ignored at State, was on
speculation.

[How do people think, now, "I was wrong."
e.g. Hsr recalls that about Aug 30, at WH,
he and others reacted to pics of SA-2's: "Aha,
that's what they're seeing. People who have never
seen a missile before would think this was a big
missile..." He assumes now he was wrong; there
were both. But there weren't; MRBMs did not come in
till mid-Sept.

Problem of mistaken Resevaluations: Wrong reasons."

24 March

Plan:

Agent reporting: more of it in first week in Sept reporting
objects bigger than SA-2's [Even they connect?]

Even more in Sept:

State wouldn't pay attention.

Around 5 Sept: order to USIB to "clean speculation
on missiles in Cuba." [Why? JFK & Rusk just
didn't want to be bothered by this stuff?]

[Note: last flight 5 Sept: because ~~Q-2~~ SA-2's in?

To avoid "incidents"? Because JFK now
convinced that only SA-2's were involved?] [^{SAC-SIA} fight?]

[See McCullagh, secret testimony.]

McCullagh's conviction, as soon as he heard of SA-2's
(late August): "Why SA-2's? To shoot something high.
What's high? U-2's. Why shoot U-2's? To prevent
observation of something serious. What's serious? MRBMs."

Held to this conviction; if he had been dead, views would
have had more weight.

Light begins July 25

S4M sites: first activity Aug 5; first units were deployed by 11,
last Oct 16; system activated & operating Oct 27.

One unit deployed 2600 ft.

Initial focus: crops were harvested Aug 29; received Oct 1

M29P: No visible activity, Aug 29, Sept 6; probably -
1830 late first visible activity Aug 29 (recognized?)

Tl-23: first known delivery - Sept 28.

[No mention of civilian activity outside Cuba, e.g. in
SU, letters to Pres; informal channels (despatch?)

No mention of response to activity Cuba to US
actions (e.g. to air alert) (or in East Germany).

No mention of evidence of SIS plots of embassies to
US actions.

No evidence of SIS plots of embassies to
US actions as to intentions.

Limitations of photos: only 33 MRBM's identified in Cuba
before observation of 42 being withdrawn.

Not known whether nosecones & missiles ever mutual
at any.

Not known whether any simulated launch exercises
involving erection on launcher (could have occurred
before first coverage or at night!).

Full reinfo cap. would have required 48 missiles.

Possibly ~ 42 IRBM sites (4 under tanks), demand:

24+16.

Kryvitsky - Stevenson 8 Nov; K to Brit. Publ. Roberts 72 Nov,
said warheads had been removed.

Low profile in Nov. was to assume US that offensive
missiles were big withdrawn; statement that warheads at
present would not have slowed. (?)

22,000 Pows on 22 Nov: most correct.

SAM deployment to give silent-wire cover, not
was motivation of military sites.

Re-deployment by early '63.

Most in west explained by fact work in Sept;
could have been up. But no evidence they were
activated individually or as part-system till 26.2.1964

First missiles on site about 18.1 ft (earlier 16.8 ft),
last missile 16 Oct, on site 19 Oct.

Others: 22, 28 1ft, 23 Oct, 6.3 Oct, E.

If warheads, virtually certain some missiles could
have been launched from one or more sites by
two sites first identified 14 Oct, and that some
could have been launched from all 6 by 23 Oct.

No evidence of effort to alert or "heat" any part
of MRBM force during wars.

[Study says nothing of attempts to mislead
Only on intent or actions. ?]

More than 200 reports of missiles in Cuba prior to
for '62. Also reports of construction equipment in
Spring '62 in areas where SAM sites located later, but
photos failed to reveal.

But, reports may have reflected low personnel numbers
planning, preparation
associated with buildup that began by early
in late Feb. Present no have greatest import.
(wrong) of extent.

// [Finding? for preparatory actions to lead to
reports that will be disposable, disavowable later,
true reports.]

[Agents may report inferences, conclusions, as facts.]

No previous indication that low and forces brought
to start states prior to 22 Oct, nor that subsequently
the wire placed in position suggesting hostilities were
minent.

In late '61, pub. during & after 22nd Party Congress.
It, prob. reappreciated in light of Vietnam & pre '61,
Sino-North in August [Eg of Pigs? Sandtrap?],
resolution of myth of low ICBM capacity in Oct.,
country econ problem, controversy with Chicos.

Intention to establish a military base in Cuba probably
had origins in policy deliberations of that time; first
committed pub at still spring.

Kerry later felt that it understood "rules of the
game" — that bases on opponents property are facts of
great power life, not provocation to war.

[+ no asymmetry.]

assembly of Il-28's went on slowly but steadily
all night - 7:00.

Although ~~has~~^{not} aware of US now at least by
mid '62, nor so after, they didn't need to complete
AS system or parts. Probably goal date of first half of Nov;
not intended to screen building.

Around units addressed between first week in Sept.
- mid-Oct. Cut till winter by mid-late.

Assumption that Sov leaders regarded risks as low.
Could have — but didn't — plan build as signaling
situation in which defense screened offensive weapons
or minimize time between first identifiable 48cm sites +
SP readiness of whole system.

Ignored possibility of US overflight. Choice
inevitable (?) unless Sov leaders (?) judged confidently
that US would agree, or not react militarily — so (?)
poss. of US detection was not critical to success or failure.

One cruise missile unit deployed operationally, from
island location, about 25 or 26 Oct;

one armored group moved out of except port late
same time.

27 Oct. V-2 shot down, probably by SA missile.

(cause can't be determined)

at all or virtually all 416-21 continued toward
the same airfield where assembled; no unusually high level
of activity, not heightened till first hit on Nov.

No discernible activity at 3 of 4 ground force
encounters, where armored groups remained highly
unwieldy to attack. Korean boats also inactive.

P. 1 Nov. Saw last began despatching.

Some indications of deliberate effort by saws to despatch
as plainly as possible that missiles + boats were given
(No attempt to withdraw; 128 Mots demolished; cooperated in
pulling back tanks at sea when challenged).

22-28 Oct

in Cuba

Some actions taken to improve combat readiness, but most of them not till several days after Pres speech, and then appear to have been earlier than intended; all other elements of Sov forces showed little, or no change in status.

? indecision & confusion?

* Most immediate reaction [in Cuba] was establishment
on 23 & 24 Oct of two direct command comm. links between
Moscow + Cuban (presenter? no scrambler duration till
28 Oct).

* AD system operational 27 Oct; presenter? expanded
steadily after.

At sites, construction continued; some training?

Vehicles + equipment dispersed + camouflaged; 444 positions
+ tanks reported. May have been occasioned by much by
low-level recon starting 23 Oct as by Pres speech, for
low-level minor unit down expressed fears at the sites
with the design of attack.